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1. Introduction 
One of the fundamental tenets of fiscal federalism is that, absent various sorts of 
externalities, decentralized governments that rely on own-source revenues should be more 
fiscally efficient than decentralized governments that rely on grant financing.1  This can happen 
for a number of reasons.  First, better information by sub-national voters may allow these voters 
to better monitor decisions by sub-national politicians.  The argument is often not formalized,2 
but relies on the idea that sub-national governments, being closer to the people, are more 
accountable to its citizens.  
Second, even when central governments have perfect information, Goodspeed (2002) 
shows that important incentive problems can arise when expenditure decentralization is not 
accompanied by revenue autonomy.  Political forces lead the central government to create a soft 
budget constraint by increasing grants when sub-national governments borrow in his model.  
This leads to irresponsible behavior on the part of regional governments who borrow too much.  
A number of case studies in Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack (2003) suggest that this is an 
important element in practice. 
Accountability to citizens is also important in understanding the presence of corruption in 
government. This suggests that the financial structure and institutions of decentralized 
governments can potentially influence the degree and extent of corrupt activity.  Financial 
structures that make governments more accountable should be associated with less corruption 
                                                            
1 Grants of course also have their place in sub-national finance.  There is a large literature that develops the reasons 
for and efficiency of grant finance. Sub-national governments may provide goods that have external benefits or use 
taxes that have external costs. Grants that equalize tax bases between jurisdictions can also be justified on efficiency 
grounds.   See for instance Oates (1972) and Boadway and Flatters (1982). 
2 See Seabright (1996) for an exception. 
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(other things equal), while financial structures with less accountability should be associated with 
more corrupt activities. 
The relationship between decentralization and corruption is particularly important in 
developing countries, where corruption is a known problem.  Yet the relationship between 
decentralized government and corruption remains murky even though the potential advantages of 
decentralization are well known (for example, better tailoring of public expenditures to diverse 
preferences as discussed in Oates, 1972).  The literature to date is divided on the relationship 
between decentralization and corruption from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. 
On the theoretical side, Schleifer and Vishny (1993) point out that centralized corruption 
has certain advantages with respect to economic efficiency because a central government official 
is able to internalize externalities.  Decentralized corruption, on the other hand, may lead to 
greater overall corruption as decentralized authorities do no internalize the external costs of 
corruption. 
In a similar argument, Mancur Olson and Martin McGuire (1996) also suggest that 
centralized corruption has certain advantages for the economy as a whole.  They argue that a 
centralized thief will have an incentive to limit his theft relative to a “roving bandit”.  The roving 
bandit has an incentive to set up a monopoly, limit his theft and “make himself a public-good-
providing king.”  Other arguments that suggest decentralization will lead to greater corruption 
have also been put forward.  For instance, some argue that decentralized governments may 
attract less qualified bureaucrats (Tanzi, 1996, and Prud’homme, 1995). 
In contrast to the above arguments suggesting that corruption is likely to be greater at 
decentralized levels of government, the primary argument for lower corruption at decentralized 
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levels is the ability of decentralized governments to be more accountable to its citizens.  The 
most formal development of this argument is Seabright (1996). 
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) and also in a series of other papers suggest that 
uninformed voters are more susceptible to corruption.  Corruption thus depends on the degree to 
which voters are informed.  Under certain assumptions, decentralized politicians are more likely 
to bend to the wishes of the rich elite.  They are thus not very sanguine about the consequences 
of decentralization, at least in certain circumstances – under decentralization the poor may be 
both more likely to be subject to bribes and less likely to obtain the public goods that they want.  
The basic argument is that uninformed voters are influenced by bribes, so politicians 
representing rich elites are elected by a combination of rich informed voters, and poor 
uninformed voters who vote for the rich candidate because of bribes.  While the ultimate 
consequences for decentralization depend on relative parameter values, decentralized 
governments may end up providing too many services to elites and not enough to the uninformed 
poor, and may as well be more corrupt than centralized governments.  In addition, an interesting 
implication is that the level of corruption is likely to vary across regions depending in the degree 
to which voters are informed. 
A further issue that influences both accountability and corruption in decentralized 
governments is the question of a soft budget constraint.  This occurs when decentralized 
governments are financed by grants and the central government is unable to commit to not 
increase grants in the face of sub-national profligacy, as suggested in Wildasin (1997), Inman 
(2003) and Goodspeed (2002).  For instance, Goodspeed shows that a politically aware central 
government will find it difficult to resist increasing grants when the political gains of doing so 
outweigh the political costs.  The central government may thus find itself politically trapped.  
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Regional governments that predict this will have incentives to overspend for two reasons: (i) a 
common property problem in financing additional grants, and (ii) a direct reduction in the 
opportunity cost of spending. 
The soft budget constraint literature is instructive because it shows that it is not just 
centralization or decentralization per se that matters.  It is the institutions of federalism, and in 
this case the structure of the financing of sub-national governments that matter greatly.  Viewed 
in this way, the soft budget constraint becomes another way in which accountability can be lost 
under decentralization when sub-national governments are financed by grants.  A number of case 
studies in Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack (2003) suggest that this is an important element in 
practice. 
On the empirical side, some papers use fiscal measures of decentralization, such as the 
ratio of decentralized expenditures to total government expenditures across countries.  These 
papers, such as the careful study of Fisman and Gatti (2001), generally find that countries with a 
greater fiscal measure of decentralization are associated with less corruption.  (See also Huther 
and Shah, 1999.)  Other authors, such as Triesman (2000), use a binary variable of whether a 
country is federal or not – defined mainly in political terms – and find a positive association with 
corruption.  More recently, Fan, Lin, and Treisman (2009), again using cross-country data, find 
that countries with a greater number of government tiers or a greater number of public 
employees are associated with more corruption, although countries with governments that 
constitute a larger share of GDP are associated with less corruption. 
These empirical studies suffer from certain deficiencies.  First, almost all are studies to 
date are cross-sectional country studies.  It is difficult to control for all the factors other than 
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decentralization that affect corruption across countries.  The danger is that such studies may 
attribute to decentralization a causal effect when it is really a third factor that is correlated with 
decentralization that is the true causal effect.  Secondly, these studies do not study how the 
funding source for decentralized governments may influence corruption. 
Bardhan (2006) surveys some within-country studies of particular aspects of 
accountability that add evidence to the debate.  I will not survey these studies here, but suffice it 
to say that none deals directly with the issue of the method of finance of sub-national 
governments.  They do however shed light on accountability and decentralized public service 
delivery, literacy rates, political competition, monitoring, media access, and unfunded mandates. 
This paper develops a simple model of the connection between sub-national funding 
sources and corruption, and tests the implications of the model using data on sub-national states 
in Mexico.  The model relies on information asymmetries between different levels of 
government.  The main implications are that greater use of own-taxes reduces sub-national 
corruption, greater use of grants increases sub-national corruption, and more uniformed voters 
increases corruption. 
The study takes advantage of data from a project of the Mexican government to develop a 
National Index of Corruption and Good Governance.  This index is available for 2001, 2003, 
2005, and 2007.  Thus, a panel data set is constructed for Mexican sub-national states over these 
years. 
The paper is most closely related to the cross-country analysis in Fisman and Gatti 
(2001).  However, Fisman and Gatti’s measure of decentralization is a simple ratio of 
decentralized expenditures to total government expenditures.  While this is a common measure, 
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as noted above it has been argued that the fiscal set up of a federal system may affect the 
relationship between corruption and decentralization, however.  We therefore examine whether 
the source of funding for Mexican states is related to corruption. 
The main findings are that greater use of own tax revenues lowers corruption while 
greater use of grants increases corruption.  This suggests that expenditure decentralization that is 
accompanied by revenue decentralization is likely to discourage corruption while expenditure 
decentralization that is funded by grants tends to encourage corruption. We also find that sub-
national poverty, a measure of the uninformed citizens of a region, leads to greater corruption as 
suggested by the model. 
2. A Model of Corruption and the Structure of Sub-national Government Finance  
 To understand the relationship between corruption and the structure of sub-national 
government finance, we begin with the simplest type of moral hazard model that builds on the 
work of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) in which all politicians are assumed to be corrupt.  
This simplifies the problem as there is therefore no selection problem of good and bad 
politicians.  Politicians are however constrained in their corruption activities by the possibility of 
re-election.  The model can be extended to include both adverse selection and moral hazard, 
along the lines of Besley (2006), Besley and Smart (2007), and Hindriks and Lockwood (2009) 
but the simpler model suffices for our purposes here.   
 There are two periods, and in each period the cost of the public good, θ, is either high, H, 
with probability q or low, L, with probability (1 – q).  θ is independently and identically 
distributed in each period.  Knowledge about θ varies for the economic actors in the model, 
however, as in Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000).  We consider three types of economic actors - 
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regional governments, regional voters, and the central government.  The regional government’s 
corrupt politicians know θ perfectly.  The central government cannot observe the true cost of the 
regional public good.  To make the contrast between the central government and regional 
governments as stark as possible, we assume that regional voters know the true cost of the public 
good.3  Corruption comes about in the model by corrupt regional politicians diverting tax 
revenue for their own use.  The difficulty is that when regional spending is high, the central 
government does not know whether this is because of truly high costs, or whether a region that 
experiences low costs is pretending to be a high-cost region with corrupt politicians taking the 
excess revenues. 
 We are interested in exploring the implications of sub-national tax versus grant finance 
when corruption of this sort (diversion of public funds for private use by regional politicians) is 
possible.  The interesting result is that it turns out that the structure of sub-national finance 
influences the level of corruption.  This happens because of the differences in information at the 
different levels of government. 
 We consider as our objective function the maximization of expected utility.  Utility is 
assumed to be a function of private consumption in periods 1 and 2, Cθ1 and Cθ2, and public 
consumption in periods 1 and 2, Gθ1 and Gθ2.  The regional government budget constraints in 
periods 1 and 2 are: 
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 (1 )
G
G
G s g t Y b
G s g t Y b r
θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ
θ
θ
+ = + +
+ = + − +  
                                                            
3 Results become more complicated, but the basic message is the same if regional voters are less informed than the 
regional politicians, but more informed than the central government. 
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for θ = L, H where s denotes the excess revenues taken by politicians, Gθ is true public spending 
(GH for a high cost region and GL for a low cost region), g is grants, t is the tax rate and Y is the 
tax base (income for instance).  The budget constraint also allows for public borrowing, bθ in 
period 1 which must be paid back in period 2.  Grants are assumed to be financed by the central 
government; to simplify we assume this is a lump sum tax, equal across regions.  The central 
government budget constraints in periods 1 and 2 are: 
1 1 1
2 2 2
( )
( )
c
Hi Li
i
c
Hi Li
i
t N g g
t N g g
= +
= +
∑
∑
 
where the sum is over regions.  Since regional public consumption is financed by regional taxes, 
private budget constraints in periods 1 and 2 are: 
1 1 1
2 2 2
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
c
C
c
C
C Y t t b
C Y t t b r
θ θ
θ θ
= − − +
= − − − +  
for θ = L, H, where we also allow for private borrowing. 
 In addition to the constraints on public and private consumption, there are two additional 
constraints.  First, we want to rule out the case where the politician simply takes all tax revenues 
and does not stand for re-election.  We therefore need to impose a participation constraint that 
requires that the politician is at least as well off standing for re-election as not.  This constraint is 
easiest to develop by realizing that in period 2 all politicians will abscond with maximum tax 
revenues, T.  This implies that to get the politician to run for re-election, we will have to allow 
the diversion of public funds in period 1 for a high cost region to be greater than or equal to 
maximum period 1 revenues less the discounted present value of maximum period 2 revenues: sH 
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≥ (1-β)T.  Since grants constitutes another revenue source and borrowing is also possible, we 
need to add to this period 1 grants, the maximum period 1 borrowing, and the discounted present 
value of borrowing that must be paid back in period 2.  We also need to subtract the discounted 
present value of period 2 grants.  To simplify, we assume that period 1 and period 2 grants are 
the same: 
1 1 1 1( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )H H H GH H H GH G GPC s t Y b g HG T g b b rθβ β β= + + − ≥ − + − + + +  
 The central government suffers from imperfect information about the cost of the regional 
public good.  Thus, for the central government, we also want to insure that a low cost region 
prefers to truthfully implement the low cost spending and tax levels rather than implement the 
high cost spending and tax levels and pocket the cost difference.  This defines the incentive 
compatibility constraint: 
1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( )L L H GH H H H HIC s t Y b g LG s H L G≥ + + − = + −  
Note that the incentive compatibility constraint is irrelevant for regional voters since they have 
perfect information concerning costs. 
 Solving the problem by backwards induction, regional politicians will take the money 
and run in period 2 as there is no re-election possibility.  Thus, the behavior of politicians in 
period 2 cannot be influenced, and the interesting part of the problem therefore deals with the 
optimal period 1 policies.  
 We consider separately the problems faced by regional voters, who will vote on regional 
taxes and borrowing, and the central government, which will decide on grant levels.  Consider 
first the problem of regional voters.  Optimal period 1 regional policies can be derived by 
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maximizing the decisive voter’s expected utility subject to the above constraints on public and 
private spending, and the participation constraint.  The decisive regional voter’s problem is thus: 
1
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2,
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
2 2 2
2 2 2
[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] (1 )[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]
. . (1 ) , ,
, ,
(1 ) (1 ), ,
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i
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s t C Y t t b L H
t Y G s b g L H
C Y t t b r L H
t Y G
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s b
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θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ
θ θ θ
θ
θ θ
θ
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= − − + =
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= − − − + =
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1 1 1
2 2 2
1 1 1 1
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( )
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( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
iG i
c
i H i L
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+ − =
= +
= +
= + + − ≥ − + − + + +
∑
∑
 
The first order conditions for ti1L, ti1H, biGH, and biGL are: 
1 1
1 1
1 2
1 2
(1 )[ ] 0
[ ] 0
1 (1 )[ ] 0
1 (1 )(1 )[ ] 0
i i
i L i L
i i
i H i H
i i
i H i H
i i
i L i L
u wYq Y
G L C
u wYq Y
G H C
u u rq
G H G H
u u rq
G L G L
∂ ∂− − =∂ ∂
∂ ∂− =∂ ∂
∂ ∂ +− =∂ ∂
∂ ∂ +− − =∂ ∂  
Re-writing the first order conditions yields: 
1
1
1
1
1 1
2 2
/
/
/
/
/ / (1 )
/ /
i i L
i i L
i i H
i i H
i i H i i L
i i H i i L
u G L
w C
u G H
w C
u G u G r
u G u G
∂ ∂ =∂ ∂
∂ ∂ =∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= = +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
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 Regional politicians set the marginal benefit of public spending equal to the true marginal 
cost, and hence follow efficient spending patterns on the margin in period 1.  The participation 
constraint allows them a certain amount of rents to insure that they will not take all public funds 
in period 1, but does not change their marginal incentives.  Hence, corrupt politicians that face 
knowledgeable voters set marginal benefit equal to marginal cost in period 1 in order to be re-
elected in period 2.  Such politicians also use borrowing efficiently on the margin, equating 
marginal benefit and marginal cost.  This is because we have assumed no information problems 
of regional voters, and we have not included any soft budget constraint problems (such as 
modeled in Goodspeed, 2002, when there is perfect information) in which regional governments 
correctly predict that the central government will increase second period grants in response to 
first period regional borrowing.  Such an analysis would be in interesting extension of the current 
model, however. 
 Next consider the central government’s problem.  The central government would like to 
optimally distribute grants to regional governments.  However, the central government suffers 
from an information problem: it does not observe the true cost of the regional public good, θ.  
Hence, when it observes a high cost regional government, it does not know whether that 
government is really low cost with corrupt politicians taking the difference between high and low 
cost spending, or is truly a high cost region.  Thus, for the central government, we want to 
impose an additional incentive compatibility constraint to insure that a low cost region prefers to 
truthfully implement the low cost spending and tax levels. 
 The central government’s optimal selection of grants can be derived by maximizing the 
sum of expected utility over regions subject to the above constraints on public and private 
spending, the participation constraint, and the incentive compatibility constraint: 
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The first order conditions for gi1H and gi1L are: 
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With respect to low cost regions, the optimal central government grant policy mimics the optimal 
tax policy of regional voters: grants should be used to set marginal benefit of public spending in 
period 1 equal to the marginal cost.   
 The result with respect to high cost regions requires some explanation.  For high cost 
regions, optimal grants are not set equal to true marginal costs, H.  This results from the fact that 
the central government is trying to deter low cost regions from claiming to be high cost.  To do 
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this requires that the central government equate marginal benefits to something higher than true 
costs.  This implies that grants and hence public spending are optimally lower than the first-best 
for high cost regions.  It is also evident that the larger the difference between the high- and low- 
cost cases, the lower should be grants and spending for high-cost regions.  In addition, the 
greater is the probability of low-costs relative to high costs, the lower should be grants and 
spending for high cost regions. 
 It is also important to note that corruption is higher in the case in which regional spending 
is financed by grants.  This is clear from the incentive compatibility constraint.  A low cost 
region that pretends to be a high cost region will obtain additional rents (relative to the a truly 
high cost region) of (H-L)G1H.  The intuition of the first order condition is that the central 
government can limit the damage by reducing G1H relative to the first-best.  Although there are 
losses because the high cost region has to suffer lower than first-best spending, the gain is that 
corruption is limited and low-cost regions can maintain their relatively high spending levels. 
 Bringing together the results yields the following testable hypotheses. 
Proposition 1: The more regional governments rely on own-taxes, the lower is regional 
corruption. 
Proposition 2: The more regional governments rely on grants, the higher is regional corruption. 
Proposition 3: The less informed are regional voters, the greater is regional corruption. 
3. Decentralized Finance in Mexico 
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 Mexico is a country with 32 state governments and over 2000 municipalities.  
Government expenditures such as health and education are decentralized, making Mexico about 
average with respect to expenditure decentralization in the OECD.  (OECD 2003). 
 Mexico has a relatively high level of corruption among OECD countries.  As shown in 
Table 1, Mexico has the unfortunate distinction of ranking last among OECD countries in 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index.  Moreover, there is substantial 
variation across Mexican states.  For the measure that we use in this study (the INBCG, 
described further below), the least corrupt state in 2007 was Colimas at 3.1 and the most corrupt 
was the State of Mexico at 18.8.  (The index range is 0 to 100.) 
 The funding of expenditures is not very decentralized in Mexico.  Mexican state 
governments finance their expenditures mainly through grants from the central government.  
Approximately 90 percent of funding is through grants while only about 10 percent comes from 
local sources; this makes Mexico highly centralized among OECD countries with respect to 
revenue decentralization.  (OECD, 2003) 
 Hence, Mexican states rely primarily on grants from the federal government.  These 
grants are generally of two sorts, a large unconditional grant (termed Ramo 28) and a set of 
conditional grants (termed Ramo 33).  The unconditional grant comprises about 38 percent of 
revenues and the conditional grants about 47 percent. 
 The unconditional grant is primarily composed of the General Participation Fund (and 
hence is sometimes called participaciones).  The conditional grants (termed aportaciones) 
consist primarily of grants for education (FAEB) and health (FASSA).  The education grants 
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constitute about two-thirds of unconditional grants and health grants about 12 percent.  (OECD 
2003). 
 The conditional grants of Ramo 33 are not designed with any formula; the criteria seem 
to be somewhat arbitrary and mainly related to the amount spent previously in the given 
category.  (OECD 2003)  Moreover, the conditional grants are comprised of many different 
grants with no obvious coordination.  These problems with the conditional grants suggest that 
they may be ripe for manipulation and corruption. 
 The unconditional Ramo 28 transfers have a formula, although the formula has been 
criticized for lacking much of a rationale.  For instance, the General Participation Fund seems to 
give wealthier states more unconditional grants per-capita than poorer ones.  This runs counter to 
the usual idea that unconditional grants should equalize resources as in Canada for instance. The 
reason for this is historical:  the General Participation Fund allowed the federal government to 
convince the states to voluntarily give up their own tax systems in exchange for central 
government transfers.  As a practical matter, states received about what they had previously 
collected.  A formula is used for the distribution of this fund to the states which involves a 
weight of about 45 percent on historic quantities of tax collections, a weight of about 45 percent 
on a state’s population and a weight of about 10 percent on an equalizing component.  
4. Data and econometric model 
 The data for the study are taken from a few Mexican sources.  The main objective is to 
determine how decentralization of different varieties impacts corruption.  Corruption is difficult 
to measure, but fortunately the Mexican government and Transparencia Mexicana have been 
involved in the past decade in a project to develop a National Index of Corruption and Good 
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Governance (INBCG).  This index is now available for 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007.  Thus a 
panel data set can be constructed for these years. 
 The INBCG is designed to measure corruption in government.  It is constructed using a 
survey of households.  In 2007, 14,836 households were surveyed, with between 237 and 501 
questionnaires per state.  The survey asks whether a household has had to make an under the 
table payment in obtaining a public service for 35 public services (the same as in the 2005 
survey).  The index measures the percent of times a bribe has had to be made to obtain a public 
service, and so its range is 0 to 100. 
 Based on the survey, it is estimated that 198 million acts of corruption occurred in 
obtaining public services in 2007, with total payments of 27 billion pesos.  The average payment 
was thus 137 pesos or about 8 percent of the income of Mexican households. 
 As mentioned above, one important variable in theory is the degree to which the 
population is informed.  Uninformed populations are less aware of political maneuvering and 
thus less able to distinguish whether a high-cost government actually has low costs and is taking 
the difference in costs as rent.  We use a measure of poverty to proxy for the uninformed 
population.  A poverty index which gives the percent of the population in food poverty is 
available for Mexican States from CONEVAL, the National Council of Evaluation of Social 
Development Policy.  Unfortunately this data is available at the state level only for the years 
2000 and 2005.  For the intervening years, we interpolate to get the data points for 2001 and 
2003 to match to the INBCG index. 
 The main policy variables that we are interested in are the financial statistics of the 
Mexican states.  Hence another important set of data are the budgets of the Mexican states.  This 
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data was obtained from the National Statistics Institute of Mexico (INEGI), and includes the 
sources of revenue of each Mexican state.  For each state, we calculated per-capita own-tax 
revenues, unconditional grant revenues, conditional grant revenues, and total grant revenues 
from these statistics for 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007.  Nominal values were converted to real 
2005 pesos using the Mexican Consumer Price Index. 
 Previous cross-national studies such as Fisman and Gatti (2001) use the ratio of sub-
national government expenditures to total government expenditures as a measure of 
decentralization.  While this is a reasonable measure that has been used extensively in the 
literature, it is a rather blunt measure.  In particular, it takes no account of how those 
expenditures are financed.  Moreover, as mentioned above, while Mexico is an average OECD 
country in terms of expenditure decentralization, it is one of the most centralized OECD 
countries when it comes to the source of funding.  Our measure thus improves on previous 
decentralization measures and seems particularly important for the case of Mexico. 
 Among our controls are the following.  We include a measure of government size 
because larger governments could be more susceptible to corruption both because such 
governments may be less transparent and because citizens may be more tempted to use bribes to 
cut through queues or red tape.  We measure government size as total state government 
expenditures.  We also include a measure of the size of the state’s economy, real GDP per capita, 
and its population to capture the effect of size in the private sector.  Since foreign investment 
may be more subject to bribes, we include as a control foreign investment in a state.  We also 
include density since large cities may result in greater corruption than rural areas. 
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Since as suggested above, greater reliance on grant funding can make sub-national 
governments less accountable to its citizens and increase the possibilities for corruption, we will 
use various measures of grant and own-tax financing as our measure of decentralization.  We 
begin by using own-tax revenue per capita.  The expectation is that the more own-tax revenue a 
state has, the more accountable it is, and hence the lower is corruption.  We then add measures of 
grant financing.  We use an aggregate measure of grant financing, conditional (aportaciones) 
plus unconditional (participaciones) grants per capita and we also disaggregate this measure, 
looking at conditional and unconditional grants per capita separately.  Our basic econometric 
specification is thus: 
it 0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
  
 - _ _    
it it it it
it it it it it
Corruption GDP Pop Govsize FInvest
Poverty Own Source Cond Grant Uncond Grant u
α α α α α
α α α α
= + + + +
+ + + + +  
where GDPit is state real GDP per capita, Popit is population, Govsizeit is measured as total 
revenue, FInvestit is foreign investment, Povertyit is the poverty index, Own-Sourceit is own-
source revenues per capita, Cond_Grantit conditional grants per-capita, and  Uncond_Grantit is 
unconditional grants per-capita. Pesos are converted to real 2005 values using the Mexican 
Consumer Price Index.  All the results we present will include fixed state effects.  
5. A First Look at the Data 
 Before turning to the regression results, it is useful to first examine the raw relationship 
between the variables of interest more informally.  Table 2 shows the average values across the 
states for each year of per-capita own-tax revenues, unconditional, conditional, and total grant 
revenues, the poverty index, and corruption.  As indicated, the average level of corruption fell 
from 2001 to 2003, and then rose again in 2005.  The poverty measure follows a similar pattern 
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(its value being unavailable for 2007).  The financial variables all rose over time on average in 
real terms.  The greatest percentage increase over time was in own-tax revenues, followed by 
conditional and then unconditional grants.  However, some states experienced larger increases in 
per-capita own-tax revenues than others.  What we want to know is whether the states that 
experienced larger than average increases in own-tax revenues performed better on the 
corruption survey than those states that experienced smaller than average increases in own-tax 
revenue.  We also want to know the same for the other policy variables.  Did states that 
experienced larger increases in poverty do worse on the corruption survey than states that 
experienced smaller increases in poverty?  Did states that experienced larger increases in 
conditional grants do worse on the corruption survey than states that experienced smaller 
increases in poverty?  Did states that experienced larger increases in unconditional grants do 
worse on the corruption survey than states that experienced smaller increases in poverty? 
 Tables 3 and 4 illustrate the main results.  For each of four main variables (poverty, per-
capita own-tax revenues, per-capita conditional grants, and per-capita unconditional grants) plus 
the corruption index, we took the difference between the 2005 value of the variable and the 2001 
value.  (2005 is used rather than 2007 because the poverty index is not available in 2007.)  We 
then computed the average change across states of each of the four main policy variables.  We 
then divided the Mexican states into those that were above the average change and those that 
were below.  Again this was done for each of the four main variables.  We then computed the 
average change in the corruption index over the period for the two categories (above the average 
and below the average) for each of the four policy variables.  Tables 3 and 4 plot the results in 
bar charts. 
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 Table 3 plots the results for poverty and own-tax revenues.  The first bar chart is that for 
the fall in poverty between 2001 and 2005.  The first bar in this chart shows the average change 
in corruption for states in which poverty fell by more than the average.  The second bar in this 
chart shows the change in corruption for states in which poverty fell by less than the average.  As 
is evident from the chart, states where poverty fell the most experienced a smaller increase in 
corruption.  States where poverty fell the least (or increased) experienced a greater increase in 
corruption. Thus, lower poverty is associated with relatively lower corruption. 
 The second bar chart in Table 3 is that for the increase in own-tax revenue between 2001 
and 2005.  The first bar in this chart shows the average change in corruption for states in which 
own-tax revenue rose by more than the average.  The second bar in this chart shows the change 
in corruption for states in which own-tax revenue rose by less than the average.  As is evident 
from the chart, states where own tax revenue rose the most experienced a smaller increase in 
corruption.  States where own-tax revenue rose the least experienced a greater increase in 
corruption. Thus, higher own-tax revenue is associated with lower corruption.  
 Table 4 plots the results for unconditional and conditional grants per-capita.  The first bar 
chart is that for the increase in unconditional grants between 2001 and 2005.  The first bar in this 
chart shows the average change in corruption for states in which unconditional grants rose by 
more than the average.  The second bar in this chart shows the change in corruption for states in 
which unconditional grants rose by less than the average.  As is evident from the chart, states 
where unconditional grants rose the most experienced a greater increase in corruption.  States 
where unconditional grants rose the least experienced a smaller increase in corruption. Thus, 
higher unconditional grants are associated with higher corruption. 
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 The second bar chart in Table 4 is that for the increase in conditional grants per-capita 
between 2001 and 2005.  The first bar in this chart shows the average change in corruption for 
states in which conditional grants rose by more than the average.  The second bar in this chart 
shows the change in corruption for states in which conditional grants rose by less than the 
average.  As is evident from the chart, states where conditional grants rose the most experienced 
a greater increase in corruption.  States where conditional grants rose the least experienced a 
smaller increase in corruption. Thus, higher conditional grants are associated with higher 
corruption. 
6. Regression results 
The regression results are presented in Table 5.  All regressions in Table 5 include fixed 
state effects.  The first column presents just the control variables, including poverty as a measure 
of the uniformed citizenry.  While these generally have the expected signs, only foreign 
investment and poverty are significant.  Greater poverty is associated with greater corruption, 
which is consistent with the interpretation that poverty reflects a less informed citizenry and 
hence more scope for corruption.  Higher foreign investment is found to lead to higher 
corruption, perhaps because as investment of any sort occurs only with bribes and foreigners are 
easy targets or perhaps perceive corruption more intensely.  The other variables are insignificant, 
but most have sensible signs.  Higher density and higher populations increase corruption.  Larger 
governments also are associated with higher corruption, though insignificantly.  The negative 
sign of real GDP per capita is somewhat unexpected, though it is insignificant and becomes 
positive in the other columns. 
The second column adds own tax revenue per capita.  This has a significant negative 
sign, consistent with the hypothesis that greater own tax revenue leads to greater accountability 
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and less corruption.  The other variables are unaffected except that the poverty measure becomes 
insignificant. 
The third, fourth, and fifth columns add grant measures to the specification.  The third 
column adds unconditional grants (Ramo 28, participaciones).  This variable is positive and 
significant while the own tax revenue variable remains negative and significant.  This suggests 
that grants lead to less accountability and more corruption, while own taxes have the opposite 
effect.  Government size becomes negative but insignificant while the other variables are 
unchanged in sign and significance. 
The fourth column adds conditional grants (Ramo 33, aportaciones) instead of 
unconditional grants.  This grant variable is also positive and significant while the own tax 
variable again remains negative and significant.  This again supports the hypothesis that grants 
lead to less accountability and more corruption while own taxes lead to more accountability and 
less corruption.  Population maintains its positive sign and becomes significant suggesting that 
larger states tend to encourage corruption.  The government size variable, which is negative, 
becomes significant in column four.  This is intriguing and suggests that larger governments that 
are more accountable may actually decrease corruption. 
The fifth column uses total grants – conditional plus unconditional.  The coefficient on 
this measure of grants is also positive and significant while own tax revenue remains negative 
and significant.  The poverty measure maintains its positive sign and again becomes significant 
(as in column one), suggesting a less informed public increases corruption.  Population maintains 
its positive and significant sign while density is positive, though its significance lies just below 
90 percent.  Foreign investment maintains its positive and significant sign. 
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6. Conclusion 
Corruption and the accountability of politicians to the citizenry is an important issue, 
especially in developing countries.  A decentralized form of government can potentially 
influence accountability but whether it increases or decreases accountability has been debated.  A 
main argument in the early development of fiscal federalism was that decentralization brings 
decisions closer to the people and leads to greater accountability.  This is also the implication of 
arguments that suggest that competition between subnational governments constrains bad 
politicians.  On the other hand, some have argued that capture by special interests may be greater 
at the local level and subnational bureaucrats may be less well trained.  These arguments suggest 
that decentralization may lead to less accountability. 
A more nuanced argument is that the type of decentralization matters.  In particular, the 
fiscal set up of a federal system of government, possibly also including the political system, is 
important for understanding the advantages and disadvantages of decentralized government.  For 
instance, some authors such as Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack (2003) and Goodspeed, (2002), 
have stressed the important incentive differences that exist when expenditure decentralization is 
not accompanied by revenue decentralization.  This suggests that the relationship between 
corruption and decentralization may be affected by the type of decentralization.  It suggests, for 
instance, that accountability is lower when expenditure but not revenue is decentralized, leading 
to more corruption in this type of decentralized setting.  
This paper examines data on corruption and the structure of government in Mexican 
States from 2001 to 2007 to analyze whether and how the structure of decentralized government 
promotes or inhibits good governance.  The study takes advantage of data from a project of the 
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Mexican government to develop a National Index of Corruption and Good Governance.  This 
index is available for 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007. 
Our evidence supports the idea that better informed citizens and more reliance on own 
source revenue reduces corruption.  We find that poverty, which we interpret as measuring 
uninformed citizens, leads to greater corruption as suggested by political agency models.  We 
also find that greater use of own tax revenues lowers corruption while greater use of grants 
increases corruption.  This suggests that expenditure decentralization that is accompanied by 
revenue decentralization is likely to discourage corruption while expenditure decentralization 
that is funded by grants tends to encourage corruption. 
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Table 1: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index for OECD Countries, 2010 
TI 
rank 
Country TI Corruption 
Perception Index, 2010 
1 Denmark 9.3 
1 New Zealand 9.3 
4 Finland 9.2 
4 Sweden 9.2 
6 Canada 8.9 
7 Netherlands 8.8 
8 Australia 8.7 
8 Switzerland 8.7 
10 Norway 8.6 
11 Iceland 8.5 
11 Luxembourg 8.5 
13 Hong Kong 8.4 
14 Ireland 8.0 
15 Austria 7.9 
15 Germany 7.9 
17 Japan 7.8 
20 United Kingdom 7.6 
21 Chile 7.2 
22 Belgium 7.1 
22 United States 7.1 
25 France 6.8 
26 Estonia 6.5 
27 Slovenia 6.4 
30 Spain 6.1 
32 Portugal 6.0 
39 Korea (South) 5.4 
41 Poland 5.3 
53 Czech Republic 4.6 
56 Turkey 4.4 
59 Slovakia 4.3 
67 Italy 3.9 
78 Greece 3.5 
98 Mexico 3.1 
 
Source: Transparency International 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/in_detail 
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 Table 2 
Grants, Taxes, and Corruption in Sub-National States in Mexico: 2001-2007 
(Per-capita averages, real 2005 pesos) 
 
Year Average 
INBCG 
Corruption 
Index 
Average 
Poverty 
Level 
Average 
Own-Tax 
Revenue 
Per-Capita 
Average 
Unconditional 
Grants Per-
Capita 
Average 
Conditional 
Grants per-
Capita 
Average 
Total 
Grants Per-
Capita 
2001 7.47 21 145 2510 3528 6038 
2003 6.86 18 161 2634 3890 6524 
2005 7.98 23 200 2854 4354 7209 
2007 7.82 - 262 3062 4864 7926 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations. 
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 Table 3 
Change in corruption index (2001-2005) given  
a high/low change in poverty and a high/low change in own-tax revenues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 
States with less 
than average 
increase in own-
tax revenue 
States with greater 
than average 
increase in own-
tax revenue 
States with greater 
than average fall 
in poverty 
States with less 
than average fall 
in poverty 
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 Table 4 
Change in corruption index (2001-2005) given 
a high/low change in unconditional and conditional grants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
States with greater than 
average increase in 
unconditional grants
States with less than 
average increase in 
unconditional grants 
States with greater than 
average increase in 
conditional grants
States with less than 
average increase in 
conditional grants
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 Table 5 
Corruption and Decentralization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: Corruption Index 
 
Real GDP per capita -2.05e-05 1.58e-05 1.58e-05 5.11e-05 3.86e-05 
 (2.50e-05) (3.38e-05) (3.42e-05) (3.50e-05) (3.39e-05) 
      
Population 6.38e-07 2.57e-07 7.57e-07 9.24e-07* 1.12e-06** 
 (3.92e-07) (4.59e-07) (5.23e-07) (4.98e-07) (5.25e-07) 
      
Foreign Investment 0.000577*** 0.000597*** 0.000585*** 0.000506*** 0.000527***
 (0.000208) (0.000204) (0.000198) (0.000195) (0.000193) 
      
Density 0.000972 0.00153 0.00151 0.00170 0.00160 
 (0.000963) (0.00104) (0.00107) (0.00104) (0.00104) 
      
Government Size 2.22e-08 2.47e-08 -6.33e-08 -1.54e-07* -1.67e-07** 
 (6.17e-08) (6.09e-08) (7.34e-08) (8.19e-08) (8.36e-08) 
      
Poverty 0.0544* 0.0411 0.0538 0.0545 0.0622* 
 (0.0325) (0.0339) (0.0355) (0.0341) (0.0346) 
      
Own tax revenue per capita  -49.43* -49.39* -61.75** -56.54* 
  (29.84) (29.83) (29.17) (28.97) 
      
Unconditional grants per capita   1.004**   
   (0.494)   
      
Conditional grants per capita    1.303***  
    (0.424)  
      
Total grants per capita     0.855*** 
     (0.271) 
      
Constant 4.548*** 5.651*** 2.942 0.664 0.0182 
 (0.969) (1.181) (1.837) (2.033) (2.165) 
      
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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